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B. & A. RY. CO. v. LICHTENBERG
STATE CERTIFICATION OF CARRIER OPERATING
SOLELY UNDER FEDERAL CONTRACT
Baltimore & A. Ry. Co. v. Lichtenberg et al.'
The Federal Government had been engaged in con-
structing buildings at sites near Annapolis on both sides
of the Severn River, some near the railroad and some as
much as four miles distant therefrom. As the Govern-
ment required the use of workmen otherwise unemployed
and on relief, and as there was no adequate supply of such
men nearby, the Federal Works Progress Administration
had been furnishing them from Baltimore. The plaintiffs-
appellees, who were not usually engaged in transporting
passengers, entered into an exclusive contract with the
Federal Government to haul such workmen to and from
Annapolis each day. Ordinary freight trucks were used
at a flat rate per round trip, running from a pick-up point
in Baltimore to the sites of the work and return. Such
contract was to end with the work in Annapolis and in
no case to last for more than one year. Plaintiffs-appel-
lees were required by their contract to have their trucks
duly licensed and to carry liability insurance. However,
they had made no attempt to qualify as passenger carriers
by obtaining the permit from the Public Service Commis-
sion as required by statute.2 Upon complaint by the Bal-
timore & Annapolis Ry. Co. to the Public Service Commis-
sion3 that the plaintiffs-appellees were operating as a con-
tract carrier without compliance with the appropriate stat-
utes, and were thus subjecting the railroad to unrestricted
and unregulated competion in the area served by it, the
Commission, after conducting a hearing, ordered that such
1 176 Md. 383, 4 A. (2d) 734 (1939). The Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal, without opinion, 84 L. Ed. 250, 60 S. Ct. _97 (U. S. 1939). Subse-
quently to this decision, Lichtenberg entered into an arrangement whereby
his trucks were leased to the United States Government and they were
run for the same purpose under the leasing arrangement without obtaining
any -special permits from the Maryland Public Service Commission. Lich-
tenberg was indicted and convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore
City for operating his trucks without permit in violation of Code, Art. 56,
Sec. 251, (State of Maryland v. Lichtenberg, reported in The Daily Record,
Mar. 27, 1940). On motion to the Supreme Bench, a new trial was granted
on the ground that Johnson v. Maryland, infra circa n. 8, precluded the
application of the certification provision to trucks operated directly by the
United States Government (State of Maryland v. Lichtenberg, reported in
The Daily Record, Apr. 25, 1940).
2 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Secs. 251 and 252. See also Art. 56,
See. 255.
. Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sec. 255A.
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operation be stopped. The plaintiffs-appellees then filed
this bill to enjoin enforcement of the Commission's order
on the ground that it was unreasonable and unlawful.4
The lower court decided that the single and exclusive con-
tract shown, for a comparatively short period, was not
such a transportation of passengers as was intended to
be controlled by the statutes, and that the regulation or
stoppage sought would be an unconstitutional obstruction
by the State of the performance of an essential function
of the Federal Government, and thus granted the injunc-
tion prayed.
This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals on
both points. It held that the statute as applied to plain-
tiffs-appellees did not constitute an interference with the
performance of an essential function of the Federal Gov-
ernment. The finding of the Commission to the effect that
the plaintiff s-appellees were independent contractors was
affirmed, but it was held that the facts that the operation
was for the exclusive benefit of the Government, and that
the Government had fixed their schedules and routes were
not material to that question. 5 Thus, the Court found that
the plaintiffs-appellees were not a Governmental agency
and regulation of them would not constitute an unconsti-
tutional interference with the performance of an essential
function of the Government.
Secondly, the Court held that the business of the plain-
tiffs-appellees fell within the terms of the Maryland stat-
ute which requires Public Service Commission permission
to operate.6 The broad wording of the statute, plus the
fact that carriers within it are exempted from "the public
duties of a common carrier," seemed to the Court to in-
dicate that the Legislature intended that private and con-
tract carriers, as well as common carriers, should be in-
cluded therein. The Court further found that plaintiffs-
Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 23, Sec. 359.
r Citing: Bentley, Shriver & Co. v. Edwards, 100 Md. 652, 60 A. 283
(1905) ; Hull v. Phila. & R. Ry. Co., 132 Md. 540, 104 A. 274 (1918) ; Hilton
Quarries v. Hall, 161 Md. 518, 158 A. 19 (1932).
' Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sec. 251 requires a permit for any
motor vehicle "used in the public intrastate transportation of passengers
for hire" and this definition is further elaborated in Ibid., Art. 56, Sec. 252:
"All motor vehicles, except when used exclusively for the transportation of
pupils to and from public and/or private schools, operating for hire intra-
state over the improved roads and streets of this State or of any county
or municipality thereof on regular schedules or between fixed termini . . .
shall be subject to the provisions of this subtitle . . . except that the
public duties of a common carrier shall not thereby be imposed on the
owner of any such vehicles not actually engaged in public transportation."
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appellees were operating on regular schedules and between
fixed termini, thus bringing them exactly within the stat-
ute. As to the constitutionality of its application to plain-
tiffs-appellees, the Court upheld the statute as a reason-
able exercise of police power, saying: "If the regulations
in the statute bear a conceivably reasonable relation to
highway preservation and the safety of passengers car-
ried, there would be no constitutional objection".' Then
the Court went on to point out how the prerequisites for
a permit and the regulations promulgated by the Commis-
sion would operate to the benefit of public convenience
and safety on the highways. The Court felt that it was
quite proper for the Commission, in granting such permits,
to inquire into the effect which an applicant's business
would have on existing common carrier service. But it
then went on to hold that the plaintiffs-appellees were not
in direct competition with the railroad, since they were
rendering a service which the railroad could not give, i. e.
distributing the workmen at the various building sites,
thus apparently leaving the way open for the Commission
to grant the plaintiffs-appellees a permit upon compliance
by them with the statute.
The case presents two main problems. First, the in-
terference by the State with the performance of an es-
sential function by the Federal Government, and second,
the regulation by a State of private and contract carriers.
As to the first, the case of Johnson v. Maryland8 is an au-
thority for the position taken by the plaintiffs-appellees.
There the State of Maryland sought to compel the driver
of a mail truck to obtain an operator's license. Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, held the State
requirement to be an unconstitutional interference with
an essential function of the Federal Government. He
pointed out that an employee of the United States does
not enjoy complete immunity from State laws while act-
ing in the course of his employment, that the State can
regulate matters merely incidental to the carrying out of
his employment, but he felt that this license requirement
did not fall within the exceptions stated, because it, in
effect, allowed a State to determine the competency of a
man to work for the Federal Government. In the Lich-
74 A. (2d) 734, 737 (Md. 1939).
1 Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U . S. 51, 41 S. Ct. 16, 65 L. Ed. 126 (1920).
See n. 1, supra, for subsequent actions of Lichtenberg in reliance on this
case.
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tenberg case, this argument was met by holding that plain-
tiffs-appellees were independent contractors. Reliance
was placed upon James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,9 in which
the State of West Virginia sought to impose a tax upon
the gross income of a construction company engaged in
building dams and locks in navigable waters within the
State under a contract with the United States. The Su-
preme Court dissolved an injunction restraining the col-
lection of such tax, holding that, as the taxpayer was an
independent contractor, a tax on its gross income would
not "lay a direct burden on the Federal Government" and
would not hinder the Government in the exercise of an
essential function. On this theory the Court of Appeals
avoided any conflict with Johnson v. Maryland. However,
from recent taxation cases, it might be said that the Su-
preme Court has adopted a more liberal view on such a
question and that the authority of Johnson v. Maryland
may have been somewhat weakened. 10
The second problem involves state regulation of private
and contract carriers, or more specifically, state certifi-
cation of contract motor carriers. Since the early case
of Munn v. Illinois,'. common carriage was accepted as
the touchstone of publicness, needed to sustain business
regulations (rate control, certification, etc.) against due
process objection.12 Motor carriage, accordingly, would
have presented no special problem if common carriage
alone had been involved. Upon the extension of certifi-
cation and rate control to common carriers by motor truck,
however, it became apparent that there were a great many
trucks on the highways not operated as common carriers,
but nevertheless demanding regulation because of the large
volume of business done as private or contract carriers.
One of the earlier methods of regulating the latter was
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed.
155, 114 A. L. R. 318 (1937). See also Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269
U. S. 514, 46 S. Ct. 172, 70 L. Ed. 384 (1926), and Allward v. Johnson, 282
U. S. 509, 75 L. Ed. 496, 51 S. Ct. 273, 75 A. L. R. 9 (1931).
10 See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427
(1938) ; and Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 83 L. Ed. 927, 59 S. Ct. 595
(1939), noted (1939) 4 Md. L. Rev. 77, where a State tax on the income
of an employee of a Federal agency was held to be valid in the absence of
a showing that such a tax would result in actual hindrance of such agency
in the performance of its function. See supra n. 1, for subsequent activi-
ties of Lichtenberg as supported by Johnson v. Maryland.1194 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
22 See Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in Anericau Law (1928) 41
Harv. L. Rev. 278; Goddard, The Evolution and Devolution of Public
Utility Law (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 577.
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merely to extend existing common carrier regulations to
cover all carriers for hire, making no distinction between
public and private carriage; but, the Supreme Court sev-
eral times has held such a method unconstitutional. In
Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke" a State
statute provided that any carrier for hire over the State
highways should be deemed a common carrier and regu-
lated as such (including the obligations to furnish "ade-
quate, safe and convenient service to the public" and to
supply an indemnity bond covering the goods carried).
The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to
make a contract carrier into a common carrier by legis-
lative fiat. Again, in Frost v. Railway Commission of Cali-
fornia,4 the State statute covering common carriers was
extended to cover private and contract carriers. A car-
rier operating under a single private contract was ordered
to cease operations until he obtained a certificate of con-
venience and necessity in accordance with the statute.
The Supreme Court of California upheld the statute as
applied to contract carriers on the theory that while a
State has no power to make a private carrier into a com-
mon carrier, it can make a private carrier dedicate his
property to a public use as a condition precedent to the
use of the public highways for profit. The United States
Supreme Court conceded that the State might regulate
the use of its highways as a place of business, but it held
that the California statute fell under the prohibition of
Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke and was
thus unconstitutional. Again, in Smith v. Cahoon," a Flor-
ida statute was held unconstitutional which provided reg-
ulation for any vehicle "used in the business of transport-
ing persons or property for compensation or as a common
carrier over any public highway in this State between
fixed termini or over a regular route". A contract carrier
was arrested for operating without the certificate of con-
venience and necessity required by the statute. The Su-
preme Court of Florida upheld the statute, saying that
it did not require private carriers to become common car-
riers, and the provisions of the statute that were legally
applicable only to common carriers were not intended to
be applied to, and were not applied to, corporations or
11 Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 S. Ct.
191, 69 L. Ed. 445 (1925).
" Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46 S. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed.
1101 (1926).
11 Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. Ed. 1264 (1931).
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persons who were not common carriers, though engaged
in the transportation to which the statute refers. How-
ever, it also held that under the state police powers a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity could be required
of private as well as public carriers. The Supreme Court
was of the opinion, first, that the statute did in fact place
public and private carriage on precisely the same footing,
thus bringing the statute within the prohibition of the
Forst case and Michigan P. U. C. v. Duke; 6 secondly, that
even under the construction placed upon the statute by
the Florida court, the statute was invalid because, as a
criminal statute, it failed to provide a sufficiently clear
standard of conduct.
However, none of the above decisions went so far
as to hold exactly that a private or contract carrier could
not be subjected to certification. 7 In Continental Baking
Co. v. Woodring8 a limited form of private carrier certi-
fication was approved by the Supreme Court. The Kan-
sas statute involved in that case purported to regulate
motor vehicle transportation but distinguished between
"public motor carriers", "contract motor carriers", and
"private motor carriers", and it expressly stated that a
contract motor carrier is one who is not a public motor
carrier. As the Supreme Court construed the statute it
did not require private and contract carriers to obtain
a certificate of convenience and necessity, as was required
of public carriers, but only a "license", which the com-
mission had no discretion to refuse if the carrier complied
with normal safety and tax regulations. Under such a
construction the Court felt that the Kansas Legislature
did not attempt to compel private carriers to become pub-
lic carriers and did not purport to put them on an identi-
cal footing. Those regulations common to both were held,
with respect to private carriers, to be a reasonable exer-
cise of police power. Finally, in Stephenson v. Binford, 9
regulation was sustained which imposed certification re-
quirements (and also control of rates) on contract car-
riage. The Texas statute, there involved, placed private
17 See notes 11 and 12, supra.
17 See, Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Motor Carrier Regulation: Federal,
State and Municipal (1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 954; Brown and Scott, Regu-
lation of The Contract Motor Carrier (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 530.
Is Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 52 S. Ct. 595, 76
L. Ed. 1155 (1932).
19 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 S. Ct. 181, 77 L. Ed. 288, 87
A. L. R. 721 (1932).
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and contract carriers in a separate category from common
carriers but imposed almost identical regulations upon
both classes of carriers. The private contract carriers were
required to obtain "permits" to operate which might be
refused if the proposed service might decrease the effi-
ciency of the existing service, and could be obliged to
charge minimum rates not less than the existing rates of
common carriers. A bill was filed to enjoin enforcement
of the statute on the ground that it required private car-
riers to become common carriers, reliance being placed
upon Michigan P. U. C. v. Duke and the Frost case.20 The
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland,
held that the statute was constitutional. The earlier cases
were distinguished on the ground that the Texas statute
did not attempt to make common carriers out of private
carriers. Each class of carriers had its own set of regu-
lations, and private carriers were only regulated as pri-
vate carriers. The Court then went on to justify the regu-
lation of private carriers. The State's highways were pub-
lic property, it argued, and the use of them as a place of
business could be restricted by the State in the interest
of the public generally in order to relieve congestion and
conserve the highways themselves. Promotion of public
safety and convenience on the highways was within the
realm of the State's police powers and thus the statute
was valid if it constituted a reasonable exercise of such
powers. The Court then applied the familiar presump-
tion of reasonableness in the absence of a showing to
the contrary. About a year later, in Hicklin v. Coney,2'
a South Carolina statute imposing similar regulations upon
contract motor carriers was held constitutional by the
Supreme Court on the same sort of argument. 22
20 Supra, notes 11 and 12.
21 Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, 54 S. Ct. 142, 78 L. Ed. 247 (1933).
It is to be noted that in all of these cases the regulation was sustained
as a reasonable exercise of police power without regard to whether or not
private or contract carriage was a business "affected with a public inter-
est". The latter phrase has been frequently used in cases Involving public
utility regulation, but its significance as a label or formula was destroyed
by the Supreme Court in Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78
L. Ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934), where it was held to be synonymous with
"subject to the exercise of the police power". Cf. supra n. 12.
22 Throughout the cases including Stephenson v. Binford and Hicklin v.
Coney, there has been argument as to the validity of provisions in the
statutes which might be construed as requiring cargo insurance of the
contract carriers. The United States Supreme Court opinions, however,
leave the question undetermined by refusing to construe the statutes so
as to raise this point of questionable constitutionality in the absence of
prior state construction requiring it. The case likewise raises an interest-
ing "equal protection of the laws" question not observed in this note.
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In Maryland, prior to the Lichtenberg case, dispute as
to control of private carriage settled largely around the
control of co-operatives.2 3 In Rutledge Cooperative Assoc'n,
Inc. v. Baughman,24 the Court of Appeals had before it a
bill to enjoin the Public Service Commission from prose-
cuting a cooperative for transporting milk and farm pro-
duce for its members by truck without the requisite per-
mit from the Public Service Commission.2" The Court as-
sumed for purposes of argument that the Cooperative was
a private carrier, and the specific question raised was, as
in the case under discussion, whether the Legislature had
the authority to require such a permit. The Court first
pointed out that the statute did not attempt to make a com-
mon carrier out of a private carrier but merely subjected
the latter to some of the same regulations as a common car-
rier. It then went on to discuss the public necessity of
such regulation from two angles. The private carrier has
engaged in substantially the same character of business
as the common carrier, rendered practically the same ser-
vice, and offered competition just as destructive as com-
mon-law common carriers. If private carriage were not
subjected to regulation it would prevent rendition of ade-
quate public service by the existing common carriers and
would make ineffective regulation of the latter to secure
such service. Furthermore, if the number of trucks on the
highways were not restricted, there would result traffic
congestion, danger to the traveling public, and damage to
highway surfaces with the resulting expense to the State.
Thus the Court found that competition with existing com-
mon carriers, highway conservation, and public safety pro-
2- On control of co-operatives, see, Schneider, Will Co-operatively Owned
Utilities Go Unregulated by State Commissions? (1939) Wise. L. Rev.
409; Mitchell and Cormeny, Modern Classiflcationm: Carrier8 Transporting
Goods for Co-operative Associations (1939) 21 Corn. L. Q. 657. For a
complete line of Maryland certification cases see: Smith v. State, 130 Md.
482, 100 A. 778 (1917) ; Towers v. Wildason, 135 Md. 677, 109 A. 471
(1920), (cf. Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sees. 252A-252E) ; Goldsworthy
v. Pub. Ser. Comm., 141 Md. 674. 119 A. 693 (1922) ; Restivo v. Pub. Ser.
Comm.. 149 Md. 30, 129 A. 884 (1925); Public Ser. Comm. v. West. Md.
Dairy, 150 Md. 641, 135 A. 136 (1926), appeal dismissed. 274 U. S. 765, 71
L. Ed. 1334, 47 S. Ct. 763 (1927) ; Pub. Ser. Comm. v. Express Lines, 168
Md. 581, 179 A. 176 (1935); Pub. Ser. Comm. v. Bakery and Dairy, 176
Md. 191, 4 A. (2d) 130 (1939) ; also, the co-operative cases in notes 22, 24
infra. Cf. Pub. Ser. Comm. v. Williams, 166 Md. 277, 170 A. 517 (1934).
167 Md. 316, 173 A. 259 (1934).
24 Rutledge Cooperative Association, Inc.. v. Baughman, 153 Md. 297,
138 A. 29, 56 A. L. R. 1042 (1927).
" The statute here referred to is Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Secs.
258 and 259 which cover carriers of freight in substantially the same way
that Ibid., Art. 56, Sees. 251 and 252 regulate passenger carriers.
[VOL. IV
B. & A. RY. CO. v. LICHTENBERG
duced a demand for regulation which the Legislature had
the power to satisfy.
About six years later Parlett Cooperative Inc. v. Tide-
water Lines20 presented substantially the same question.
The Tidewater Lines operated trucks as a common carrier
over certain routes in Howard County pursuant to a cer-
tificate issued by the Public Service Commission. The
Parlett Cooperative commenced to carry milk for its mem-
bers over the same routes without obtaining the statutory
permit. Tidewater Lines brought a bill to enjoin such
operation, alleging that it was losing business to the Co-
operative. By way of defense the Cooperative questioned
the authority of the Legislature to require it, as a private
carrier, to obtain a permit. It was contended that the
Rutledge case27 had been overruled by the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith v. Cahoon.28 The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the Florida statute in the latter case sought
to impose upon private carriers all of the same regulations
imposed upon common carriers, thus bringing it within
the prohibition set out in the earlier Supreme Court de-
cisions, 29 while the Maryland statute dealt only with pub-
lic transportation, including the co-operative by definition.
The Court in this connection made a statement which
seemed on its face to pave the way for the contention of
the plaintiffs-appellees in the Lichtenberg case. 0 It said
that "the Maryland statute affects only motor vehicle trans-
portation affected by a public interest. The appellant in
that case (Smith v. Cahoon, supra) served a single per-
son under an exclusive contract, and there was no con-
troversy as to his status as a private carrier, and the ser-
vice was in no way affected by a public interest."'" How-
ever, it seems reasonable to suppose that the Court was
speaking of contract carriers of freight only, especially in
view of the fact that the Maryland statute expressly ex-
empts such carriers from its regulation.3 2  Having dis-
posed of this question, the Court sustained the statute in
20 Parlett Cooperative, Inc., v. Tidewater Lines, Inc., 164 Md. 405, 165 A.
313 (1933). C7. Co-operative Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm., 168 Md. 95, 176 A.
611 (1935) as to co-operative's right to extend its services to new members
without Public Service Commission approval.
27 Supra, n. 21.
28 Supra, n. 13.
29 Supra, notes 11, 12.
20 Supra, n. 1.
11 Parlett Cooperative, Inc. v. Tidewater Lines, Inc., 164 Md. 405, 165 A.
313 (1933).
3 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sec. 259.
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much the same manner as in the Rutledge case.33 Since
the decision in the latter case the Supreme Court had
handed down its decision in Stephenson v. Binford,4 and
the Court of Appeals followed that decision very closely.
It pointed out that the statutes in that case and the one
before it rested upon the same principle, namely that a
State had the power, in the public interest, to "prohibit
or condition as it sees fit" the use of the highways for
gain. Then the Court went on to show just how the pub-
lic interest was to be promoted by the regulation set out
in the statute. As in the Rutledge case, the public inter-
est in protecting existing common carriers from unre-
strained competition, in safety on the highways, and in
conserving the highways themselves was held to be suffi-
cient to justify the statute's express inclusion of co-op-
eratives.
The Lichtenberg case,35 as has been seen, presents for
the first time in Maryland the validity of the statute re-
quiring contract carriers of passengers to obtain a per-
mit from the Public Service Commission. 6 After hold-
ing that the carrier fell within the terms of the statute,37
the Court went on to sustain the statute as a valid police
regulation. Much the same reasoning was used as in the
Rutledge case and the Parlett case. The statutory pre-
requisites were set out and held to be "reasonable require-
ments for the use of highways for gain", and the Court
also pointed out that the public had an additional inter-
est in the effect of contract carriage on the existing com-
mon carrier service, although it reduced the importance
of that factor by holding that, under the particular facts
before it, the contract carrier was not competing with the
existing common carrier. However, it is sufficiently clear
that the Court was using the same approach as in earlier
Maryland cases which followed the principles laid down
in Stephenson v. Binford, s that regulation of the high-
ways for the protection of public safety and convenience
may extend to certification of contract carriage as well as
to common carriage for hire.
" Supra, n. 21.
11 Supra, n. 17. However, the Court of Appeals seems to miss the swing
away from the "affected with a public interest" concept in Stephenson v.
Binford.
" Supra, n. 1.
.16 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sees. 251 and 252.
17 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 56, Sec. 252 does not exempt contract car-
riers as does Ibid., Art. 56, Sec. 259.
38 Supra, n. 17.
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